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Outmezguine v. State:
ABSENCE OF
SCIENTER ELEMENT
UNDER STATE'S
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY STATUTE IS NOT
VIOLATIVE OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT.

In Outmezguine v. State,
335 Md. 20, 64] A.2d 870
(1994), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland upheld the State's
child pornography statute which
strictly prohibits the photographing or filming of a minor
engaged in an obscene act or
sexual conduct. Inafive-to-one
decision, the court determined
that the statute neither required
the State to prove scienter nor
required a defendant so prosecuted to assert a reasonable
mistake of age defense. Accordingly, the court held that
the State's child pornography
law is not violative of the First
Amendment.
Elan Outmezguine was
convicted ofviolating Maryland
Annotated Code Article 27 §
419A(c) ("§ 419A(c)"), which
provides: "Every person who
photographs or films a minor
engaging in an obscene act or
sexual conduct ... is subject to
[a fine of not more than $25,000
and/or ten years imprisonment.]" Md. Ann. Code art. 27,
§ 419A(c) (1957). Having denied Outmezguine' s motion for
judgment of acquittal, the trial
judge similarly refused each of
the four proposed jury instructions submitted by Outmezguine,
which would have required
scienter as an element of the
offense. Thereafter, the trial
judge accepted the jury's finding that Outmezguine unlawfully photographed a 15-yearold high school student. As a
result, Outmezguine was sentenced to eight years imprisonment.
Finding no error, the
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Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland affirmed the decision
ofthe trial court. Subsequently,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to consider whether scienter is a required element ofthe offense of
photographing or filming a minor under § 419A(c) and
whether Outmezguine waived
his right to appellate review on
the issue of a mistake of age
defense.
Before addressing these
questions, however, the court
confronted the threshold issue
of whether § 419A(c), operating as a strict liability crime, is
constitutional under the First
Amendment of the United States
Constitution. The court first
considered § 419A( c) in light of
the overbreadth doctrine, a
mechanism designed to protect
First Amendment expression
from laws so broadly written
that they would have a chilling
effect on individuals taking advantage of such expression.
Acknowledging the potentially chilling effect such a
strict liability child pornography statute might have, the court
began by balancing the right of
freedom of expression against
the right of the state to protect
children against sexual exploitation. ld. at 36, 641 A.2d at
878. In so doing, the court
determined that the protected
speech in this case would most
likely not be chilled if§ 419A(c)
is indeed interpreted to be a
strictliabilityoffense.ld. at3637,641 A.2d at 878. Remarking that the statute would only
be invalidated if it were found

"substantially overbroad," the
court held that it is not an
unreasonable burden for a photographer or filmmaker to ascertain the true age of the individual being photographed or
filmed. Id. at 37, 641 A.2d at
878.
The court likewise determined that the value of the
constitutionally protected expression in this case is minimal.
Id. at 37, 641 A.2d at 879. Such
de minimis value becomes apparent upon weighing the value
of such expression against "the
State's unquestionably ... significant interest in protecting
children ... and in prohibiting
the use ofchildren as subjects in
pornographic material." Id. Essentially, the court held that the
resulting minimal chilling effect
on producers must necessarily
be sacrificed as it is not "substantial". Id. at 38, 641 A.2d at
879.
Having considered the
strict liability issue, the court
further considered whether the
First Amendment requires
scienter as an element of a §
419 A(c) offense and whether a
reasonable mistake of age defense must be available to defendants prosecuted under
Maryland's child pornography
law. After examining each issue, the court found that: 1) the
First Amendment does not require scienter as an element of
the offense and 2) a reasonable
mistake of age defense need not
be afforded defendants prosecuted under § 419A(c). Id.
In addressing scienter
and the imposition of criminal

culpability for violations ofchild
pornography laws, the court
relied on New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747 (1982). Id. at 35,
641 A.2d at 877. In Ferber, the
court emphasized that states
have a compelling interest in
protecting minors and thus can
regulate the production or dissemination of child pornography. Id. at 35, 641 A.2d 877878 (paraphrasing New Yorkv.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)).
Moreover, although the court
of appeals held that "criminal
responsibility may not be imposed for violations ofchild pornography laws without some
element of scienter on the part
of the defendant," it nevertheless provided that "[t]his
scienter requirement ... does
not refer to knowledge of the
minor's age." Id. at 40, 641
A.2d at 880. The court concluded that, rather than the age
of the minor, scienter "refers
to knowledge of the 'nature and
character' ofthe materials produced ... [hence], § 419A(c)
satisfies this requirement because a defendant photographer
must have knowledge that he or
she is taking pictures of sexual
conduct as defined in § 416."
Id.
Additionally, upon its
analysis of Maryland's child
pornography statute under the
facts of Outmezguine, the court
of appeals exercised statutory
interpretation to "ascertain and
effectuate legislative intent." Id
at 41, 641 A.2d at 880. In so
construing § 419A(c), the court
considered the statute's plain
language in its entirety to deter-

mine the intent ofthe legislature
in enacting this law. Recognizing that both subsections (b)
and (c) of § 419A include a
scienter element, the court held
that a plain reading of §419A(c)
revealed its silence as to whether
the State must prove the defendant had knowledge of the
minor'sage. Id. at41, 641 A.2d
at 881. Yet, such an omission
"was not without purposeful
design." Id. at 44,641 A.2d at
882.
In addressing such purposeful design, the court reasoned that the legislature attempted to impose criminality
based upon the perpetrator's
active versus passive involvement in the world of child pornography. Impliedly, the court
opined that subsection (c)'s attack on individuals who actively
exploit children by photographing and/or filming them resulted
in the legislature's deliberate
and purposeful omission of
knowledge of the child's age as
an element of the crime.
The court concluded its
analysis by considering the appropriateness of the mistake of
age defense under § 419A(c).
Specifically, the court determined the constitutionality of
placing the burden of production on the defendant to raise
the issue of mistake of age. The
court ultimately held that
Outmezguine failed to meet such
burden of production and, likewise, failed to elucidate the
record in this regard. Specifically, the court reasoned that
"Outmezguine's argument that
'I did not know how old she

was' [was] insufficient to generate the issue of reasonable
mistake of age in this case." Id.
at 52, 641 A.2d at 886. Thus,
the court held that the issue of
reasonable mistake of age was
not properly preserved for reVIew.
In upholding § 419A(c),
Outmezguine v. State takes the
dangerous position of permitting criminal convictions under
Maryland child pornography law
without requiring the State to
prove scienter as an element of

the offense. Understandably,
the court seeks to protect children from the cruelty of sexual
exploitation by punishing those
who engage in child pornography. Yet, to do so at the expense of impending upon a
defendant's First Amendment
rights is far more burdensome
than the court should allow.
Such overbearing interpretation
of § 419A(c), as is articulated in
Outmezguine, renders chilled a
defendant's rights under the First
Amendment and compels a re-

formed analysis of the statute.
Hence, despite the State's significant interest in protecting
children, the court's interpretation of § 419A(c) invites such
unnecessary infringement of a
defendant's First Amendment
rights that Outmezguine remains
ripe for appeal to the United
States Supreme Court.
- Lisa Y. Johnson

